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Taking	Heisenberg’s	Potentia	Seriously		R.	E.	Kastner1		Stuart	Kauffman2	Michael	Epperson3		 	October	5,	2017		 It	 is	 argued	 that	 quantum	 theory	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 requiring	 an	ontological	 duality	 of	 res	 extensa	 and	 res	 potentia,	 where	 the	 latter	 is	understood	per	Heisenberg’s	original	proposal,	and	the	former	is	roughly	equivalent	 to	 Descartes’	 ‘extended	 substance.’	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 a	dualism	of	mutually	exclusive	substances	in	the	classical	Cartesian	sense,	and	therefore	does	not	inherit	the	infamous	‘mind-body’	problem.	Rather,	res	 potentia	 and	 res	 extensa	 are	 proposed	 as	 mutually	 implicative	ontological	extants	that	serve	to	explain	the	key	conceptual	challenges	of	quantum	 theory;	 in	 particular,	 nonlocality,	 entanglement,	 null	measurements,	 and	 wave	 function	 collapse.	 It	 is	 shown	 that	 a	 natural	account	 of	 these	 quantum	 perplexities	 emerges,	 along	 with	 a	 need	 to	reassess	our	usual	ontological	commitments	involving	the	nature	of	space	and	time.			
	
I.		Introduction	and	Background			 It	is	now	well-established,	via	the	violation	of	the	various	Bell	Inequalities,	that	Nature	at	the	quantum	level	entails	a	form	of	nonlocality	such	that		it	is	not	possible	to	 account	 for	 phenomena	 in	 terms	 of	 local	 common	 causes.		 Shimony	 (2017)	provides	a	comprehensive	review	of	this	topic.		Many	researchers	have	explored,	and	continue	to	explore,	various	ways	of	retaining	some	form	of	pseudo-classical	locality	in	the	face	of	these	features	of	quantum	theory.	Among	these	are:		
• The		“Bohmian”	theory	(first	proposed	in	Bohm,	1952)		
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• Many	Worlds	(Everettian)	Interpretations		
• “Quantum	Bayesianism”	or	“Qbism”	(Fuchs,	Mermin,	Schack,	2014)		Meanwhile,	 instrumentalism	 simply	 evades	 the	 ontological	 challenges	 posed	by	evidently	nonlocal	quantum	behavior.		Qbism	claims	to	retain	locality,	but	does	so	through	a	maneuver	in	which	even	a	radically	nonlocal	theory	(not	quantum	theory,	but	 a	 hypothetical	 one	 that	 allows	 explicit	 faster-than-light	 signaling)	must	 also	 be	deemed	 ‘local,’	 as	 shown	 by	 Henson	 (2015).	 We	 believe	 that	 this	 constitutes	 a	
reductio	 ad	 absurdum	 of	 the	 Qbism	 ‘locality’	 argument,	 showing	 that	 it	 fails	 to	establish	 locality	 in	 any	physically	meaningful	 sense.	Of	 course,	we	 argue	here	 that	locality	in	light	of	quantum	theory	is	not	something	that	we	should	be	trying	to	retain,	anyway:	 the	quantum	 ‘spookiness,’	 seen	 as	 something	needing	 to	be	 suppressed	or	eliminated	 in	 the	 above	 approaches,	may	 actually	 be	 an	 important	 clue	 to	 a	 richer	ontology	of	the	world	than	has	been	previously	suspected.1		This	is	what	we	explore	herein.		 Thus,	 we	 suggest	 here	 that,	 rather	 than	 retreating	 into	 instrumentalism	 or	trying	 to	 ‘save	 locality’	 by	 adding	 various	ad	 hoc	quantities	 to	 the	 formalism	 (i.e.,	hidden	variables),	it	is	worthwhile	to	consider	the	possibility	that	the	world	is	indeed	nonlocal	at	 the	quantum	 level,	and	 to	seek	a	 fruitful	ontological	explanation.	 In	 this	regard,	 we	 want	 to	 focus	 our	 attention	 on	 Heisenberg’s	 original	 suggestion	 that	quantum	 entities	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 form	 of	 Aristotle’s	 	‘potentia.’	 For	Heisenberg,	 potentiae	 are	 not	 merely	 epistemic,	 statistical	 approximations	 of	 an	underlying	 veiled	 reality	 of	 predetermined	 facts;	 rather,	 potentiae	 are	 ontologically	fundamental	constituents	of	nature.	They	are	things	“standing	in	the	middle	between	the	idea	of	an	event	and	the	actual	event,	a	strange	kind	of	physical	reality	just	in	the	middle	 between	 possibility	 and	 reality”	 (Heisenberg	 1958,	 41).	 Elsewhere,	Heisenberg	suggests	 that	one	consider	quantum	mechanical	probabilities	as	 “a	new	kind	of	 ‘objective’	physical	 reality.	This	probability	 concept	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	concept	 of	 natural	 philosophy	 of	 the	 ancients	 such	 as	 Aristotle;	 it	 is,	 to	 a	 certain	extent,	 a	 transformation	 of	 the	 old	 ‘potentia’	 concept	 from	 a	 qualitative	 to	 a	quantitative	 idea”	 (Heisenberg	 1955,	 12).	 	 It	 is	 worth	 nothing	 that	 Shimony	 (e.g.,																																																									1	It	 seems	 important	 to	 note	 here	 that	 historically,	 anomalies	 that	 seemed	 absurd,	 unacceptable,	 or	unexplainable	 given	 a	 particular	 metaphysical	 model	 have	 always	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 natural	 and	understandable	with	the	adoption	of	a	new	model—and	that	constituted	scientific	progress.	A	case	in	point	 is	 the	anomalous	motions	of	 the	planets	 in	an	Earth-centered	ontology.	 	Without	meaning	any	disrespect	 to	 the	 esteemed	 authors	 cited	 above,	 it	 does	 seem	 to	 us	 that	 trying	 to	 retain	 our	 usual	ontological	 commitments	 by	 ‘tweaking’	 the	 basic	 theory	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 ad	 hoc	 quantities	 like	hidden	variables	 is	somewhat	akin	 to	constructing	Ptolemaic	epicycles.	 In	 fact,	as	his	colleague	Basil	Hiley	 has	 pointed	 out	 (private	 communications),	 Bohm	 himself	 abandoned	 the	 1952	 model	 and	pursued	other	 realist	 approaches	 to	understanding	quantum	 theory,	 a	quest	with	which	 the	 current	authors	 are	 sympathetic.	 We	 discuss	 this	 methodological	 issue,	 of	 concern	 not	 only	 to	 the	 present	authors	but	to	other	researchers	as	well,	in	the	penultimate	section.	
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1997)	 also	 considered	 this	 concept	 in	 connection	 with	 solving	 interpretational	challenges	of	quantum	 theory	 (although	he	 largely	 supposed	 that	 the	mental	was	a	necessary	aspect	in	the	conversion	of	potentiality	to	actuality,	with	which	the	present	authors	differ).	As	a	further	prelude	to	the	metaphysical	picture	being	considered	herein,	first	recall	 Descartes’	 dualism	 of	 res	 cogitans	 (purely	mental	 substance)	 and	 res	 extensa	(purely	 physical	 substance)	 as	 mutually	 exclusive	 counterparts.	 	 While	 seemingly	plausible,	 it	 encountered	 notorious	 difficulties	 in	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 mutually	exclusive	 substances,	 by	 definition,	 cannot	 be	 integrated,	 thus	 leading	 to	 the	‘mind/body’	 problem.	 Of	 course,	 there	 were	 many	 and	 varied	 responses	 to	 this	problem,	which	we	will	not	enter	into	here;	but	a	common	response	among	physical	scientists	has	been	simply	to	reject	res	cogitans	and	to	assume	that	only	res	extensa	exists.	 This	would	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 serviceable	 approach	 for	 classical	 physics	 (even	 if	subject	to	criticism	in	view	of	the	‘hard	problem	of	consciousness’	(Chalmers	1995)).	However,	with	the	advent	of	quantum	physics,	new	explanatory	challenges	arise	that	may	be	fruitfully	met	by	considering	a	richer	ontology.	We	 thus	 propose	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 ontological	 duality	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	dualism	of	Descartes:	 in	 addition	 to	 res	extensa,	we	 suggest,	with	Heisenberg,	what	may	be	called	res	potentia.	We	will	argue	that	admitting	the	concept	of	potentia	into	our	ontology	is	fruitful,	in	that	it	can	provide	an	account	of	the	otherwise	mysterious	nonlocal	phenomena	of	quantum	physics	and	at	 least	 three	other	 related	mysteries	(‘wave	 function	 collapse’;	 loss	 of	 interference	 on	 which-way	 information;	 ‘null	measurement’),	without	 requiring	 any	 change	 to	 the	 theory	 itself.	 This	 new	duality	omits	 Descartes’	 res	 cogitans.	 In	 addition,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 with	 respect	 to	quantum	mechanics,	res	potentia	 is	not	 itself	a	separate	or	separable	substance	that	can	 be	 ontologically	 abstracted	 from	 res	 extensa	 (i.e.,	 neither	 can	 be	 coherently	defined	without	reference	to	the	other,	 in	contrast	to	res	extensa	and	res	cogitans	 in	the	 Cartesian	 scheme).	 Thus,	 in	 the	 framework	 proposed	 herein,	 actuality	 and	potentiality	will	not	be	related	as	a	dualism	of	mutually	exclusive	concepts,	but	rather	a	
duality	of	mutually	implicative	concepts.2			As	indicated	by	the	term	‘res,’	we	do	conceive	of	res	potentia	as	an	ontological	extant	 in	 the	 same	 sense	 that	 res	extensa	 is	 typically	 conceived—i.e.	 as	 ‘substance,’	but	 in	 the	 more	 general,	 Aristotelian	 sense,	 where	 substance	 does	 not	 necessarily	entail	 conflation	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 physical	 matter,	 but	 is	 rather	 merely	 “the	essence	 of	 a	 thing	 .	 .	 .	 what	 it	 is	 said	 to	 be	 in	 respect	 of	 itself”	 (Metaphysics	 Z.4.	1029b14).	Substance,	in	this	regard,	is	the	essence	and	definition	of	a	thing,	such	that	the	 things	 defined	 (here,	 actuality	 and	 potentiality)	 are	 not	 further	 reducible,	physically	or	conceptually.	Thus,	 in	the	framework	proposed	herein,	res	extensa	and	
res	potentia	are	the	two	fundamental,	mutually	implicative	ontological	constituents	of	nature	 at	 the	 quantum	 mechanical	 level.	 More	 specifically,	 they	 are	 mutually																																																									2	For	further	elaboration,	see	Epperson	(2013,	4-10)	and	Eastman	(2003,	14-30).		
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implicative	constituents	of	every	quantum	measurement	event.3	Therefore,	our	thesis	does	 not	 inherit	 the	 mind-body	 problem	 of	 Cartesian	 dualism,	 in	 which	 two	fundamentally	 different,	mutually	 exclusive,	 substances	 have	 no	 way	 of	 interacting.	Two	of	us,	Kauffman	and	Epperson,	have	addressed	the	relevance	for	the	mind-body	problem	elsewhere	(Kauffman	2016,	Chapter	8;	Epperson	2009,	344-353).		Thus,	 the	 new	 metaphysical	 picture,	 which	 we	 will	 argue	 is	 supported	 by	quantum	 theory	 and	 its	 empirical	 success,	 consists	 of	 an	 ontological	 duality:	 res	
potentia	and	res	extensa.	 In	quantum	mechanics,	 these	are	exemplified,	respectively,	as	 systems	 in	 pure	 states	 (i.e.,	 rays	 in	 Hilbert	 space)	 and	 actual	 system	 outcomes,	which	 are	 not	 represented	 by	 pure	 states,	 but	 instead	 by	 projection	 operators	corresponding	to	the	actual	outcome.	In	this	way,	the	evaluation	of	an	observable	via	a	 quantum	 measurement	 event	 entails	 the	 actualization	 of	 one	 of	 the	 potential	outcomes	 inherent	 in	 a	pure	 state	 (i.e.	 a	 given	pure	 state	 embodies	many	potential	outcomes).	 	 It	 is	 a	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	 that	 the	 object	 of	observation	 is	 always	 an	 actual	 outcome,	 and	 never	 a	 superposition	 of	 potential	outcomes.	 Thus,	 one	 cannot	 ‘directly	 observe’	 potentiality,	 but	 rather	 only	 infer	 it	from	the	structure	of	the	theory.4		In	what	follows,	we	elaborate	this	basic	metaphysical	picture	and	discuss	how	it	 can	 help	 to	make	 sense	 of	 quantum	nonlocality,	 entanglement,	 and	 other	 related	non-classical	concepts	that	appear	to	be	forced	on	us	by	quantum	theory.	It	should	be	noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 authors	 have	 varied	 approaches	 to	 fleshing	 out	 the	metaphysics	 in	 specific	 terms.	 Thus,	 the	 proposed	metaphysical	 framework	 can	 be	exemplified	via	alternative,	but	fundamentally	compatible,	formulations.		
II.	Possibilist	Realism	vs.	Actualism	in	Quantum	Theory		We	first	note	that	res	potentia	can	be	understood	as	a	general	concept	applying	to	a	broad	range	of	possibilities.	Traditionally,	possibilist	realism	has	encompassed	all	sorts	 of	 conceivable	 possibilities,	 as	 in	 some	 versions	 of	 modal	 logic,	 (e.g.	 Lewis	1986),	and	we	do	not	advocate	the	broadest	scope	of	the	possibilities	considered	for	realism.5	We	 are	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 proposing	 that	 quantum	 entities	 and	processes	 are	 a	 particularly	 robust	 subset	 of	 these,	 which	 we	 will	 call	 quantum	
potentiae	 (QP);	 and	 that	 these	 are	 strong	 candidates	 for	 realism.	 However,	 before	focusing	 specifically	 on	 QP,	 let	 us	 first	 take	 note	 of	 an	 apparently	 mundane	 but	ontologically	significant	aspect	of	the	interplay	between	actualities	and	possibilities:	namely,	 the	way	 in	which	 actual	 events	 can	 instantaneously	 and	 ‘acausally’	 (in	 the																																																									3	cf.	Epperson	(2013,	86-87).	4	We	note	that	De	Ronde	(e.g.	2015)	has	also	proposed	ontological	potentiae	in	connection	with	quantum	theory.	5	For	example,	we	do	not	wish	to	assert	categorically	that	 ‘It	 is	possible	that	there	are	Aliens’	given	a	world	 in	 which	 evolutionary	 processes	 have	 never	 yielded	 a	 race	 of	 beings	 called	 ‘Aliens’	 (Mentzel	2016).	
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sense	of	classical,	efficient	causality)	alter	what	is	next	possible	globally.	As	one	of	us	(SK)	has	observed	(Kauffman	2016,	Chapter	7),		we	might	plan	to	meet	tomorrow	for	coffee	at	the	Downtown	Coffee	Shop.	But	suppose	that,	unbeknownst	to	us,	while	we	are	 making	 these	 plans,	 the	 coffee	 shop	 (actually)	 closes.	 Instantaneously	 and	acausally,	it	is	no	longer	possible	for	us	(or	for	anyone	no	matter	where	they	happen	to	live)	to	have	coffee	at	the	Downtown	Coffee	Shop	tomorrow.	What	is	possible	has	been	globally	and	acausally	altered	by	a	new	actual	(token	of	res	extensa).6	In	order	for	this	to	occur,	no	relativity-violating	signal	had	to	be	sent;	no	physical	law	had	to	be	 violated.	We	 simply	 allow	 that	 actual	 events	 can	 instantaneously	 and	 acausally	affect	what	 is	 next	 possible	 (given	 certain	 logical	 presuppositions,	 to	 be	 discussed	presently)	which,	in	turn,	influences	what	can	next	become	actual,	and	so	on.	In	this	way,	 there	 is	an	acausal	 ‘gap’	between	res	extensa	and	res	potentia	 in	 their	mutual	interplay,	that	corresponds	to	a	form	of	global	nonlocality.7		One	might	object	that	in	the	 above	 example	 of	 ordinary	 macroscopic	 processes,	 the	 nonlocality	 seems	confined	to	the	influence	of	actuality	on	what	is	next	possible,	since	in	the	apparently	deterministic,	classically	conceived	macroscopic	world,	actuals	lead	deterministically	to	new	actuals	(and	‘what	is	possible’	plays	no	real	dynamical	role).	However,	at	the	quantum	 level,	 this	 does	 not	 hold,	 so	 that	 the	 acausal	 gap	 really	 does	 exist	 in	 both	directions	(from	actuals	to	possibles,	and	vice	versa).	Moreover,	 we	 will	 see	 (in	 more	 detail	 below)	 that	 quantum	 potentiae	 (QP,	represented	by	the	usual	quantum	state	or	ray	in	Hilbert	Space),	like	res	potentiae	in	general,	satisfy	neither	the	Principle	of	Non-contradiction	(PNC),	nor	the	Law	of	the	Excluded	Middle	(LEM),	both	formerly	considered	as	 ‘self-evident’	 first	principles	of	logic.	 Together,	 PNC	 and	 LEM	 constitute	 a	 principle	 of	 exclusive	 disjunction	 of	contradictories,	wherein	 a	 proposition	P	 is	 necessarily	 either	 true	 or	 false,	with	 no	‘middle’	alternative.	Russell	presented	LEM	this	way:	 “Everything	must	either	be	or	not	 be”	 (Russell,	 1912,	 113).	 	 When	 interpreted	 classically,	 Russell’s	 formulation	implicitly	only	acknowledges	one	mode	of	‘being’—that	which	is	actual.	Thus,	a	tacit	classical	 assumption	 behind	 LEM	 is	 that	 of	 actualism:	 the	 doctrine	 that	 only	 actual	things	exist.	However,	as	will	be	demonstrated	presently,	 in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics,	PNC	and	LEM	together	evince	the	ontological	significance	of	both	actuality	and	 potentiality,	 given	 that	 every	 quantum	 measurement	 entails	 the	 former’s	
																																																								6	While	 ‘acausal’	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 of	 efficient	 causality	 (wherein	 one	 actual	 state	 causally	influences	 another	 actual	 state),	 in	 the	quantum	mechanical	 sense	of	 causality	wherein	potentia	 are	treated	as	ontologically	significant,	the	actualized	state	is	understood	to	‘causally’	alter	the	probability	distribution	 by	 which	 the	 next	 ‘possible’	 state	 is	 defined.	 For	 further	 discussion	 of	 this	 distinction	between	 classical	 efficient	 causality	 and	 quantum	mechanical	 causality,	 see	 Epperson	 (2004,	 92-93;	2013,	105-6).	On	the	other	hand,	under	certain	circumstances	and	at	the	relativistic	level,	where	decay	probabilities	are	taken	into	account,	the	relation	between	an	actualized	state	and	the	next	QP	state	may	itself	be	indeterministic	(see,		e.g.	Kastner	2012,	Section	3.4	and	Chapter	6).	7	cf.	Epperson	(2013,	60-62).		
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evolution	 from	 the	 latter	 by	way	 of	 probabilities,	 which	 also	 satisfy	 both	 PNC	 and	LEM.	 For	purposes	of	this	discussion,	we	will	assume	that	quantum	measurements	yield	actual	results	in	an	indeterministic	manner—i.e.,	one	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	 strictures	 of	 classical	 efficient	 causality.	 This	 indeterministic	 process	 is	represented	 by	 the	 non-unitary	 von	 Neumann	 ‘Process	 1’	 measurement	 transition	(Von	 Neumann,	 1955,	 352).	 Here,	 we	 differ	 from	 the	 usual	 assessment	 that	 the	measurement	 problem	 remains	 unsolved,	 as	 expressed	 for	 example	 by	 R.	 Griffiths	(2017).	In	fact,	insofar	as	the	measurement	transition	of	von	Neumann	(from	a	pure	to	mixed	state)	is	the	primary	aspect	of	the	measurement	problem,	two	of	us	(RK	and	ME)	have	proposed	solutions,	each	unique	in	approach	yet	similarly	grounded	in	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	potentiae	proposed	here.8		We	further	note	 that	 ‘Process	1’	can	be	broken	down	into	two	stages:	 (i)	 the	transition	from	a	pure	state	to	a	mixed	state,	which	comprises	N	outcomes	within	a	well-defined	Boolean	probability	space;	and	(ii)	the	‘collapse’	to	one	specific	outcome	(actual)	 with	 its	 associated	 probability	 (RTI	 accounts	 for	 (ii)	 in	 terms	 of	 a	generalization	of	spontaneous	symmetry	breaking;	 i.e.,	one	which	 includes	the	Born	Rule	 weights).	 We	 will	 term	 the	 set	 of	 possible	 outcomes	 in	 step	 (i)	 as	 ‘probable	outcome	states’	to	denote	that	they	come	with	well-defined	Kolmogorov	probabilities.	Probable	outcome	states	of	(i),	like	the	actual	outcome	states	resulting	from	step	(ii),	do	 satisfy	 PNC	 and	 LEM;	 therefore,	 it	 is	 the	 evolution	 of	 potential	 (pure)	 states	 to	probable	states	that	bridges	res	potentia	and	res	extensa	in	quantum	mechanics,	such	that	 the	 latter	 can	 be	 formalized	 as	 actualizations	 of	 the	 former.	 	 An	 example	 of	 a	potential	(pure)	state	is	that	of	an	electron	bound	within	a	hydrogen	atom.		In	what	follows,	we	question	the	assumption	of	actualism	and	its	consequence	of	 LEM.	 First,	 it	 is	 a	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 quantum	mechanics	 that	 the	 object	 of	observation	is	always	a	macroscopic	phenomenon;	i.e.,	a	detector	click	or	the	position	of	 a	 pointer.	 That	 observation	 indirectly,	 but	 reliably,9		 allows	 an	 inference	 that	 the	prepared	 quantum	 system	 now	 occupies	 an	 actual	 outcome	 state,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	superposition	of	pure	states	(the	latter	being	forms	of	QP).	Thus,	one	cannot	‘directly	observe’	 potentiality,	 but	 can	 infer	 it	 as	 a	 calculably	 measurable	 (not	 observably	
measurable)	 aspect	 of	 the	 quantum	 ontology.	 We	 believe	 that	 the	 latter	 has	 been	overlooked	 in	 standard	 approaches	 to	 interpreting	 quantum	 theory,	 which	presuppose	 actualism.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 may	 be	 useful	 to	 recall	 Ernan	 McMullin’s	important	observation:		
…imaginability must not be made the test for ontology. The realist claim is 
that the scientist is discovering the structures of the world; it is not required in 
																																																								8	Cf.	Kastner	(2012),	(2016a),	(2017a);	Epperson	and	Zafiris	(2013);	Epperson (2004), (2009).	9	We	 say	 ‘reliably’	 because	 an	 outcome	 can	 be	 corroborated	 as	 veridically	 resulting	 in	 a	 specific	quantum	state.	
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addition that these structures be imaginable in the categories of the 
macroworld. (McMullin 1984, 15) The	relevance	of	this	remark	in	our	present	context	is	that,	as	creatures	immersed	in	world	of	phenomena	 (which,	 on	an	 individual	 level,	 are	our	 sensory	experiences	of	actual	outcomes),	it	is	easy	for	us	to	assume	that	the	phenomena	are	the	same	as	the	ontology.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 us	 to	 imagine	 or	 conceptualize	 any	 other	categories	of	reality	beyond	the	level	of	actual—i.e.,	what	is	immediately	available	to	us	in	perceptual	terms.	Indeed,	for	millennia,	focusing	solely	on	the	phenomena	was	absolutely	 necessary	 for	 survival;	 were	 we	 spending	 significant	 amounts	 of	 time	imagining	and	conceiving	of	underlying	and	nonperceived	realities,	we	would	never	have	survived	the	process	of	evolution	to	our	present	state!	Thus,	our	‘default	setting’	is	actualism;	but	McMullin	reminds	us	that	this	is	not	obligatory,	and	can	serve	as	an	impediment	to	progress	in	understanding.		In	particular,	one	of	us,	RK,	has	criticized	the	prevailing	actualist	assumption	in	 the	 context	 of	 certain	 ‘time-symmetric’	 interpretations	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	(such	as	those	of	Sutherland,	Price	and	Wharton	cited	above)	that	everything	exists	within	"the	spacetime	theater,"	which	leads	to	a	static	block	world	ontology---yet	one	which	is	often	portrayed	as	involving	some	sort	of	dynamical	story	(Kastner,	2017).	Another	of	us,	ME,	with	Elias	Zafiris,	has	 formalized	a	 similar	argument	against	 the	time-symmetric,	 actualist	 classical	 block	 world	 ontology,	 proposing	 a	 topological	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	whereby	spatiotemporal	extensiveness	and	its	metrical	structure	is	emergent	from	dynamical	topological	quantum	event	structures	and,	 respectively,	 the	 set	 theoretic	 framework	 of	 the	 former	 is	 generalized	 to	 the	category	theoretic	framework	of	the	latter	(Epperson		&	Zafiris,	2013;	see	also	Zafiris	&	Mallios,	2011).			Both	of	these	arguments	evince	that	a	static	block	world	comprising	no	more	than	a	set	of	actual	events	cannot	really	be	a	dynamical	ontology.	This	inconsistency	is	 generally	 either	 simply	 ignored,	 or	 is	 glossed	 over	 by	 equivocation	 between	ontological	and	epistemic	considerations.	 	A	notable	and	creditable	exception	 is	 the	explicit	 acknowledgment	 by	 Stuckey,	 Silberstein	 et	 al	 that	 the	 3+1	 block	 world	ontology	is	adynamical	(e.g.,	Stuckey,	Silberstein	and	Cifone	2008).		 We	can	retain	a	truly	dynamical	account	of	quantum	mechanics	by	taking	into	account	 res	 potentia.	 Feynman	 famously	 re-derived	 the	 quantum	 laws	 in	 his	 ‘sum	over	paths’	approach	by	taking	a	quantum	system	as	taking	‘all	possible	paths’	from	an	 initial	 prepared	 position	 to	 a	 final	 detected	 position	 (the	 latter	 constituting	 the	result	of	a	measurement).	Clearly,	such	a	system	does	not	actually	 take	distinct	and	mutually	exclusive	paths;	its	'taking	of	all	possible	paths’	is	properly	regarded	as	a	set	of	 possibilities,	 not	 actualities.	 Thus,	 Feynman’s	 possible	paths	 of	 a	 quantum	entity	exemplify	our	notion	of	res	potentia;	and	his	derivation	of	quantum	theory	implicitly	rejects	actualism.	We	suggest	that	the	efficacy	of	his	possibilist	approach	in	yielding	a	formalism	 that	 was	 initially	 arrived	 at	 by	 heuristic	 mathematical	 data-fitting	 is	evidence	that	it	captures	some	ontological	feature(s)	of	reality.		
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	 Thus,	we	propose	that	quantum	mechanics	evinces	a	reality	that	entails	both	actualities	 (res	 extensa)	 and	 potentia	 (res	 potentia),	 wherein	 the	 latter	 are	 as	ontologically	significant	as	the	former,	and	not	merely	an	epistemic	abstraction	as	in	classical	mechanics.	On	this	proposal,	quantum	mechanics	IS	about	what	exists	in	the	world;	but	what	exists	comprises	both	possibles	and	actuals.	Thus,	while	John	Bell’s	insistence	on	“beables”	as	opposed	to	just	“observables”	constituted	a	laudable	return	to	realism	about	quantum	theory	in	the	face	of	growing	instrumentalism,	he	too	fell	into	 the	 default	 actualism	 assumption;	 i.e.,	 he	 assumed	 that	 to	 ‘be’	 meant	 ‘to	 be	actual,’	so	that	his	‘beables’	were	assumed	to	be	actual	but	unknown	hidden	variables.	Thus,	 the	 option	 of	 considering	 potentiae	 as	 something	 eligible	 for	 ‘beable’	 status	continued	to	be	overlooked.		Regarding	 Feynman’s	 reconstruction	 of	 quantum	 theory	 by	way	 of	 ‘possible	paths’:	 here	 it	 is	worthwhile	 to	 recall	 Einstein’s	 distinction	 between	 	 “constructive	theories”	and	 “principle	 theories.”	A	constructive	 theory,	 according	 to	Einstein,	was	one	that	built	up	the	theory	from	basic	physical	concepts,	in	such	a	way	that	one	could	see	 physical	 processes	 at	 work	 in	 yielding	 the	 phenomena.	 That	 is,	 it	 provided	 a	specific	physical	model.	An	example	is	the	kinetic	period	of	gases,	which	provided	a	constructive	model	of	processes	resulting	 in	 the	empirical	 laws	of	 thermodynamics.	Einstein	commented	of	constructive	theories	that:		
They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of 
the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start 
out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, 
and diffusional processes to movements of molecules – i.e., to build them 
up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say that we have 
succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably 
mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes 
in question. (Einstein, 1919)		In	 contrast,	 a	 principle	 theory	 was	 one	 that	 followed	 from	 one	 or	 more	abstract	 principles,	 such	 as	 conservation	 laws,	 symmetries,	 etc.	 	 Quantum	 theory	actually	started	out	with	Heisenberg	as	empirical	data	fitting,	from	which	he	obtained	his	matrix	mechanics.	Then	Schrödinger	brought	into	play	specific	principles,	such	as	replacing	energy	and	momentum	with	their	space-time	operators.	It	was	actually	not	until	 Feynman	 that	 some	 form	 of	 constructive	 quantum	 theory	 was	 presented,	however	 strange	 the	 proposed	 model	 was.	 Can	 one	 view	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 electron	simultaneously	pursuing	all	possible	paths	as	a	“model”?	Certainly	not	in	the	classical,	actualist	sense	we	are	used	to.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	model,	and	it	does	yield	the	theory	that	was	 arrived	 at	 earlier	 through	 data	 fitting	 and	 abstract	 principles.	We	 believe	that	 Einstein's	 insight	 was	 correct	 –	 that	 when	 one	 has	 a	 constructive	model,	 one	gains	insight	into	physical	processes	underlying	the	phenomena	that	one	lacks	with	a	principal-only	theory.	This	leads	us	to	consider	the	ontological	reality	of	possibilities.	
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III.	Res	potentia	and	Res	extensa:	Linked	Through	Measurement		 In	 this	 section,	we	discuss	 in	more	detail	 the	 key	 features	 of	 res	potentia	 as	embodied	 in	 the	 quantum	potentiae	 (QP),	 the	manner	 in	which	 res	 potentia	 in	 the	form	of	QP	is	transformed	in	res	extensa	through	measurement,	and	implications	for	the	relationship	between	QP	and	res	extensa.			Consider	the	following	two	propositions	concerning	a	two-slit	experiment:		
X.	“The	photon	possibly	went	through	slit	A.”		Note	that	one	can	say	of	X:	“X	is	true	AND	‘not	X’	is	true”	without	contradiction.10	Thus	X,	 understood	 as	 a	 statement	 of	 possibility,	 does	 not	 obey	 the	 law	 of	 the	 excluded	middle.	On	the	other	hand,	consider	Y:		
Y.		“The	photon	was	detected	at	point	P	on	the	detection	screen.”		Y,	as	a	statement	about	an	actuality,	does	obey	the	law	of	the	excluded	middle.			 	Proposition	 X	 applies	 to	 a	 situation	 involving	 a	 quantum	 superposition	 (an	instance	 of	 Feynman’s	 ‘sum	 over	 paths’),	 while	 Y	 applies	 to	 the	 result	 of	 a	measurement.	Thus,	we	propose	that	measurement	is	a	real,	physical	process,	albeit	indeterministic	 and	 acausal,	 that	 transforms	 possibles	 into	 actuals.	 In	 terms	 of	 our	proposed	non-substance	dualism,	res	potentia	is	transformed	into	res	extensa	through	measurement.		One	 specific,	 quantitative	model	 of	 such	 a	 transformation	 is	 provided	 in	 the	Relativistic	Transactional	Interpretation	(RTI)	(Kastner	2012,	Chapters	3	and	6,	and	Appendix	 C	 on	 the	 specific	 conditions	 yielding	 measurement	 in	 the	 EPR	 context);	another	 is	 given	 in	 the	 sheaf	 theoretic,	 topological	 Relational	 Realist	 (RR)	interpretation	(Epperson	&	Zafiris,	2013).		One	need	not	subscribe	to	either	of	these	models	in	order	to	consider	the	current	proposal,	which	simply	points	out	in	general	terms	 the	 efficacy	 of	 allowing	 for	 a	 non-substance	 duality	 of	 res	 potentia	 and	 res	
extensa,	 where	 the	 former	 is	 transformed	 into	 the	 latter	 through	 measurement.	Further,	 the	 concept	 of	 quantum	 mechanical	 actualization	 of	 potentia	 via	measurement	 need	 not	 commit	 one	 to	 a	 specific	 theory	 of	 measurement	 itself	(although	we	assume	that	measurement	is	genuinely	non-unitary	and	that	there	are	no	hidden	variables).		 	 			 Consider	 again	 the	 two-slit	 experiment	 discussed	 above.	 If	 we	 wished,	 we	could	 modify	 our	 experiment	 such	 that	 the	 measurement	 outcome	 triggered	generation	of	a	new	quantum	state	(e.g.,	a	photon	prepared	in	a	known	pure	state	and	subject	to	further	measurement).	In	such	a	case,	the	measurement	acausally	yields	a																																																									10	As	a	statement	of	possibility,	‘Not-X’	is	understood	to	mean:	“The	photon	possibly	did	not	go	through	A.”	
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new	actual	(the	outcome	leading	to	the	new	prepared	state),	which	in	turn	can	bring	about	new	quantum	possibles	 (QP)—since	 the	prepared	pure	 state	 is	 a	potentiality	only.	Since	the	bringing	about	of	the	new	QP	in	this	manner	is	not	a	causal	process	(it	is	 indeterministic),	 	actuals	 (arising	via	measurement)	acausally	dictate	what	 is	next	
possible.	With	this	in	mind,	we	may	next	see	how	allowing	for	this	real	interplay	of	res	potentia	with	res	extensa	can	help	to	make	sense	of	some	notorious	peculiarities	of	quantum	theory.		
III	A.	Possibles,	Nonlocality,	and	Entanglement	
	 The	 quantum	 system	 pursuing	 "all	 possible	 paths"	 in	 Feynman’s	 model	 is	obviously	engaging	in	a	radically	nonlocal	activity:	it	is	in	all	possible	places	at	once	at	any	given	time.	Of	course,	Feynman	was	working	with	a	particle–like	picture;	 in	the	wave	 picture,	 such	 nonlocal	 activity	 seems	more	 natural,	 since	 a	wave	 is	 naturally	‘spread	out’.	However,	the	de	Broglie	waves	corresponding	to	quantum	states	are	not	spacetime	 objects;	 it	 is	 only	 discrete,	 localized	 phenomena	 that	 are	 in-principle-observable	 elements	 of	 spacetime.	 In	 terms	 of	 our	 non-substance	 dualism,	 the	 de	Broglie	 waves	 are	 the	 possibilities	 (res	 potentia),	 while	 the	 discrete	 localized	phenomena	 are	 the	 actualities	 (res	 extensa).	 A	 possibility	 is,	 in	 principle,	 not	 a	spacetime	 object;	 it	 is	 rather	 a	 vehicle	 of	 enablement	 (noncausal	 and	 inherently	indeterministic)	 of	 spacetime	 actualities.	 Thus,	 a	 quantum	 entity,	 prior	 to	actualization,	is	a	nonlocal	object	(quantum	potentia,	QP).		With	this	picture	in	mind,	a	composite	system	of	more	than	one	quantum	entity,	such	as	an	entangled	pair	in	an	EPR	experiment,	can	be	seen	as	a	naturally	nonlocal	QP	form	that	can	give	rise	to	two	actualities	(i.e.	two	observable	spacetime	outcomes)	instead	of	a	single	one.			As	an	example,	consider	the	form	of	QP	consisting	of	two	entangled	spin-1/2	degrees	of	freedom	in	a	singlet	state,	with	opposite	momenta.		Either	can	potentially	be	‘up’	or	‘down’	along	any	measurement	direction,	but	they	are	anticorrelated.	If	one	is	measured	and	found	‘up,’	that	constitutes	a	new	actual	(i.e.,	a	spacetime	event	and	token	of	res	extensa).	Instantaneously	and	acausally,	the	possibility	that	the	other	will	be	 measured	 to	 be	 ‘up’	 (along	 the	 same	 axis)	 has	 vanished.11	But	 nothing	 has	disappeared	from	spacetime,	nor	has	there	been	any	influence	exceeding	the	speed	of	light	 within	 spacetime;	 so	 there	 has	 been	 no	 violation	 of	 relativity,	 which	 governs	only	 the	 domain	 of	 actuals	 (spacetime	 events).	 Notice	 also	 that,	 in	 keeping	 with	relativity,	 there	 need	 be	 no	 fact	 of	 the	 matter	 about	 which	 degree	 of	 freedom	 is	measured	 ‘first.’	 The	 QP	 consisting	 of	 the	 two	 correlated	 degrees	 of	 freedom,	 not																																																									11	It	 is	 often	 supposed	 that	measurement	 results	 obtain	 as	 a	 result	 of	 decoherence	 in	 a	 unitary-only	account,	which	leaves	small	but	nonvanishing	off-diagonal	elements;	but	that	approach	does	not	solve	the	problem	of	measurement	and	is	arguably	circular	(cf.	Kastner	2014).		Again,	here	we	assume	that	measurement	is	a	non-unitary	process	corresponding	to	von	Neumann’s	‘Process	1,’	which	really	does	yield	an	exactly	diagonal	density	matrix	that	can	be	interpreted	epistemically.	Thus,	upon	actualization	of	one	outcome	(step	(ii)	of	the	measurement	transition,	‘collapse’),	the	others	have	truly	vanished.	
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being	a	spacetime	object,	constrains--from	beyond	spacetime—the	sets	of	events	that	can	be	actualized	in	spacetime.		What	the	EPR	experiments	reveal	is	that	while	there	is,	indeed,	no	measurable	nonlocal,	efficient	causal	 influence	between	A	and	B,	 there	 is	a	measurable,	nonlocal	probability	 conditionalization	 between	 A	 and	 B	 that	 always	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 an	asymmetrical	internal	relation.	For	example,	given	the	outcome	at	A,	the	outcome	at	B	is	 internally	 related	 to	 that	 outcome.	 This	 is	 manifest	 as	 a	 probability	conditionalization	of	the	potential	outcomes	at	B	by	the	actual	outcome	at	A.	 	When	considering	the	phrase	“given	the	outcome	at	A,”	however,	it	is	crucial	to	distinguish	between	 ‘logical	 antecedence’	 and	 ‘temporal	 antecedence’	 here,	 for	 these	 are	 often	unreflectively	assimilated.	Temporal	antecedence	refers	to	an	asymmetrical	metrical	
coordination	 of	 objects	 according	 to	 the	 parameter	 of	 time	 (or	 more	 accurately,	spacetime).	 	 In	 contrast,	 logical	 antecedence	 refers	 to	 an	 asymmetrical	 logical	
supersession	of	events	such	as	that	implied	by	the	notion	of	conditional	probability	or	more	broadly,	propositional	logic;	but	in	a	quantum	mechanical	context.	In	particular,	the	 novelty	 of	 the	 quantum	 formalism	 is	 that	 (as	 applied	 to	 the	 EPR	 case)	 it	consistently	integrates	the	asymmetrical	dependencies	P(B|A)	and	P(A|B),	reflecting	that	there	need	be	no	fact	of	the	matter	about	which	outcome	is	taken	as	‘given	first.’	Specifically,	one	takes	into	account	the	observables	being	measured	locally	at	A	and	B—which	 transform	 possible	 outcomes	 to	 probable	 outcomes	 as	 in	 the	 above	terminology—and	those	together	(regardless	of	temporal	order)	dictate	the	Boolean	probability	space	applying	to	the	probable	outcomes.12	We	thus	propose	that	allowing	for	the	dualism	of	res	potentia/res	extensa	can	serve	to	explain	non-local	phenomena.		It	can	do	so	by	observing	that	the	phenomena	are	 indeed	 correlated	 (through	 their	 supporting	 potentiae),	 but	 not	 causally	connected	 in	 the	usual	way.	That	 is,	 there	 is	no	efficient	causal	 interaction	between	actuals;	 so	 we	 need	 not	 be	 concerned	 with	 the	 limitation	 of	 the	 speed	 of	 light	 on	‘signals’	between	the	two	wings	of	the	EPR	pair	(of	which	there	are	none),	nor	do	we	need	 to	 invent	 hidden	 variables	 that	 are	 not	 in	 the	 theory	 itself,	 or	 invoke	 never-observed	exotic	particles	such	as	tachyons	(Maudlin	2011.	p.	71).			
III	B.	Instantaneous,	nonlocal	change	in	the	wavefunction	upon	measurement		The	same	basic	point	holds	for	the	more	general	case	of	N	entangled	spins,	N	≥	2.	 If	 one	 is	 measured	 and	 found	 ‘up,’	 instantaneously	 the	 wave	 function	 for	 the	remaining	 N	 -1	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 changes.	 It	 is	 a	 mystery	 in	 standard	 actualist	approaches	to	quantum	mechanics	how	this	can	be	the	case.	But	in	the	ontology	of	res	potentia/res	 extensa,	 the	 explanation	 is	 straightforward:	 the	 result	 of	 the																																																									12	For	additional	elaboration,	see	Epperson	(2013,	71-80)	and	Kastner	(2012,	Appendix	C).	The	latter	gives	a	physical	account	of	how	local	measurements	dictate	the	relevant	probability	space.	Though	in	the	 specific	 experiment	 there	 happens	 to	 a	 temporal	 order	 due	 to	 timelike	 separation	 of	 the	measurements,	the	same	process	applies	regardless	of	temporal	order.	
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measurement	of	 the	first	particle	 is	a	new	actual	that	 instantaneously	and	acausally	alters	what	is	next	possible,	just	as	in	the	example	above	with	the	Downtown	Coffee	Shop.	In	this	case,	 ‘what	is	possible’	 is	just	the	state	of	the	remaining	N-1	degrees	of	freedom.	As	another	example,		consider	 photons	 in	 a	 two-slit	 experiment.	 If	 they	 are	measured	 to	have	gone	 through	either	 the	 left	or	right	slit,	 the	 interference	pattern	disappears.	Why?		Prior	to	measurement,	both	possibilities	corresponding	to	passage	through	 the	 left	 and	 right	 slit	 exist.	 If	 a	 new	 actual	 occurs,	 via	 measurement,	regarding	passage	through	the	left	(or	right)	slit,	 the	“possibility	of	passage	through	the	 right	 (or	 left)	 slit”	 vanishes,	 and	 with	 it	 the	 interference	 of	 the	 two	 quantum	potentiae	(QP),	one	of	which	no	longer	exists.			 The	same	basic	process	explains	the	phenomenon	of	‘null	measurement’:	if,	in	the	two-slit	experiment,	the	photons	are	measured	to	have	not	gone	through	the	left	slit	 (i.e.,	 NOT-L	 becomes	 a	 new	 actual),	 then	 (since	 actuals	 obey	 the	 law	 of	 the	excluded	middle),	 they	 can	 only	 have	 gone	 through	 the	 right	 slit.	 The	 interference	pattern,	which	can	only	arise	if	QP	for	passage	through	both	slits	are	really	present,	therefore	vanishes.			 Thus,	 we	 propose	 that	 an	 ontological	 dualism	 of	 res	 potentia/res	 extensa	affords	an	account	of	quantum	non-locality,	 instantaneous	and	global	wave	function	changes	 for	 N	 entangled	 spins	 when	 one	 is	 measured,	 “which-way	 information”	corresponding	 to	 loss	 of	 interference,	 and	 the	 phenomena	 associated	 with	 null	measurements.	These	are	all	key	puzzling	aspects	of	 standard	quantum	 theory	 that	are	not	readily	explained	otherwise.	Admittedly,	this	requires	expanding	our	ontology	beyond	 the	merely	 ‘actual’;	 but	we	believe	 that	 it	 is	 time	 to	do	 so,	 given	 that	many	researchers	 are	 tacitly,	 or	 even	 explicitly,	 making	 use	 of	 Heisenberg’s	 idea	 that	quantum	systems	are	forms	of	potentiae,	and/or	that	what	goes	on	in	spacetime	may	not	be	the	entire	ontological	story.		We	return	to	this	point	in	section	V.	
	
	
IV.	Potentiae	Beyond	Quantum	Mechanics?		 We	 have	 been	 focusing	 above	 on	 quantum	potentiae	 (QP).	 But,	 returning	 to	our	“Downtown	Coffee	Shop”	example	in	Section	1,	“possibilities”	are	broadly	used	in	normal	life	and	are	the	subject	of	modal	logic,	which	is	not	specifically	geared	to	the	quantum	level.	How	broadly	should	we	take	potentiae	to	be	“real”?			 It’s	useful	here	to	make	a	quantitative	distinction	between	quantum	potentiae	(QP)	and	other,	even	less	‘substantial’	forms	of	res	potentia	(call	the	latter	RP).	First,	the	QP	 are	 in-principle	quantifiable:	 given	 a	 quantum	 state	 such	 as	 |Z+>	 	 (“spin	 up	along	 z”),	 one	 can	 define	 in	 precise	 quantitative	 terms	 all	 the	 actualities	 that	 may	result,	 depending	 on	 the	 choice	 of	 measurement.	 	 In	 addition,	 given	 an	 actual	measurement	process,	one	of	 the	probable	outcomes	defined	by	 the	QP	will	 indeed	result:	 all	 measurements	 will	 have	 an	 outcome.	 This	 is	 quantified	 by	 the	 three	probability	axioms	of	Kolmogorov.	Most	significant	in	this	context	is	the	axiom	of	unit	
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measure	(AUM):	the	probability	that	at	least	one	of	the	outcomes	corresponding	to	an	eigenvalue	of	the	observable	being	measured	on	the	given	QP	will	be	actualized	is	1.	In	contrast,	an	example	of	 the	more	general	RP	 is	 the	non-quantifiable	set	of	possibilities	that	may	be	enabled	by	a	specific	evolutionary	development,	such	as	the	advent	of	 the	 swim	bladder	 in	 certain	 species	of	 fish.	One	of	us,	 SK,	 calls	 the	 set	of	resulting	 new	 possibilities	 “unprestatable,”	 signifying	 that	 there	 is	 no	way,	 even	 in	principle,	to	define	or	enumerate	such	a	set	of	possibilities	(Kauffman	2012,	Chapter	4).	Once	 such	an	organ	becomes	actual,	 an	 indefinite	number	of	unprestatable	new	possibilities	is	enabled.	For	example,	a	parasitic	worm	could	take	up	residence	in	the	swim	bladder;	 a	 disease	 of	 the	 swim	bladder	 could	 result	 in	 fish	 swimming	upside	down	(which	is	already	an	actuality);	a	swim	bladder	could	develop	into	some	other	organ.	As	for	these	general	sorts	of	RP,	they	could	all	be	actualized;	or	some	could	be,	or	 none	 at	 all.	 Thus,	 such	 possibilities	 do	 not	 obey	 the	 probability	 axioms	 of	Kolmogorov,	and	in	that	sense	are	not	quantifiable.		Yet	 clearly,	 such	 possibilities	 are	 enabled	when	 a	 new	 actuality	 occurs,	 and	vice	versa	(new	actualities	may	arise	from	the	new	possibilities).	 	It	seems	true	that	once	 the	swim	bladder	evolves,	 it	 is	 really	 true	 that	a	worm	might	evolve	 to	 live	 in	swim	bladders.	Thus,	we	confront	in	evolution	and	aspects	of	normal	life	what	appear	to	be	real	possibilities	that	are	not	quantifiable.	They	are	indefinite.	Unlike	the	usual	cases	involving	probability,	the	sample	space	is	not	known	or	even	defined.	Not	only	do	we	not	know	what	will	happen,	we	do	not	even	know	what	can	happen.		Whether	and	how	the	quantum	res	potentia	we	here	advocate	may	relate	to	what	seem	to	be	the	real	but	open-ended	potentia	of	biological	evolution	is	as	yet	unclear,	but	worthy	of	further	inquiry.			
V.	Are	Potentiae	Outside	Spacetime?		Returning	to	the	more	substantial,	quantifiable	QP	(such	as	a	quantum	system	described	by	state	|Z+>	):	these	are	pre-actual	modes	of	being,	and	as	such,	they	are	not	elements	of	spacetime.	Such	an	entity	is	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	condition	for	 an	 actuality	 that	 is	 housed	 in	 spacetime;	 the	 sufficient	 condition	 is	 that	measurement	of	the	entity	occur.13		In	this	perspective,	nonlocal	correlations	such	as	those	 of	 the	EPR	 experiment	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 natural,	mutually	 constrained	relationship	between	the	kinds	of	spacetime	actualities	 that	can	result	 from	a	given	possibility—which	itself	is	not	a	spacetime	entity.14																																																									13	According	 to	 both	 RTI	 and	 RR,	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 state	 is	 contingent	 on	 there	 being	 a	measurement	context,	defined	by	the	relevant	Hamiltonian	and	(a)	absorber	response(s)	in	the	case	of	RTI,	or	(b)	sheaf	of	Boolean	reference	frames	in	the	case	of	RR.		Thus,	such	QP	are	clearly	more	robust	than	the	general	RP	discussed	above:	once	they	exist,	something	actual	will	occur.	14	Here	we	should	distinguish	our	proposal	from	‘propensity’-type	approaches	such	as	those	of	Suárez	(2004)	and	Howard		(2012).	These	approaches	take	quantum	systems	as	existing	fully	within	spacetime	and	possessing	propensities	to	take	on	various	values	of	dynamical	quantities.	Even	though	realist	in	intent,	in	our	view	it	takes	the	state	vector	as	no	more	than	a	descriptive	and	predictive		
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This	new	ontological	picture	requires	that	we	expand	our	concept	of	 ‘what	is	real’	to	include	an	extraspatiotemporal	domain	of	quantum	possibility.	Thus,	we	need	to	‘think	outside	the	spacetime	box.’.		Other	researchers	have	recently	suggested	that	spacetime	is	not	fundamental.	For	example,	Ney	has	been	advocating	what	she	terms	“Wave	Function	Realism,”	 in	which	 the	wave	 function	 is	 taken	 as	 ontologically	 real	and	spacetime	phenomena	comprise	only	a	subspace	of	that	ontology:	“What	appears	in	the	derivative	three-dimensional	metaphysics	as	nonlocal	influence	is	explained	by	the	 evolution	 of	 the	 wave	 function	 in	 its	 space	 where	 there	 are	 no	 nonlocal	influences.”	 (Ney	2017).	 	Our	approach	differs	 in	 that	we	 regard	measurement	as	a	real,	non-unitary	process,	and	do	not	take	the	universe	as	a	whole	to	be	described	by	a	position-basis	wavefunction;	but	the	spirit	of	allowing	for	a	larger	ontology	for	the	quantum	realm	is	essentially	the	same.  Another	important	example	is	a	set	of	remarks	by	Anton	Zeilinger	considering	the	enigma	of	entanglement.	Zeilinger	notes	that:			..it	appears	that	on	the	level	of	measurements	of	properties	of	members	of	 an	 entangled	 ensemble,	 quantum	physics	 is	 oblivious	 to	 space	 and	time.	It	 appears	 that	 an	 understanding	 is	 possible	 via	 the	 notion	 of	information.	 Information	 seen	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	 obtaining	knowledge.	 Then	 quantum	 entanglement	 describes	 a	 situation	where	information	exists	about	possible	correlations	between	possible	future	results	 of	 possible	 future	 measurements	 without	 any	 information	existing	for	the	individual	measurements.	The	latter	explains	quantum	randomness,	the	first	quantum	entanglement.	And	both	have	significant	consequences	for	our	customary	notions	of	causality.	It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 what	 the	 consequences	 are	 for	 our	 notions	 of	space	and	time,	or	space-time	for	that	matter.	Space-time	itself	cannot	be	above	or	beyond	such	considerations.	I	suggest	we	need	a	new	deep	analysis	 of	 space-time,	 a	 conceptual	 analysis	 maybe	 analogous	 to	the	 one	 done	 by	 the	 Viennese	 physicist-philosopher	 Ernst	 Mach		who	 kicked	 Newton’s	 absolute	 space	 and	 absolute	 time	 form	 their	throne.	(Zeilinger	2016)	
																																																																																																																																																																								mathematical	object,	rather	than	as	directly	representing,	through	its	structure,	something	physically	existing	in	the	world.	Thus,	we	take	the	quantum	system	as	an	entity	whose	physical	structure	is	represented	by	the	structure	of	the	state	vector	(the	latter	being	a	ray	in	Hilbert	space	rather	than	a	point	or	region	in	spacetime).	Of	course,	there	is	much	more	to	explore	in	comparing	and	contrasting	the	ontologies	envisioned,	which	may	have	some	common	ground;	we	leave	this	extensive	discussion	for	a	separate	work.	
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	 What	the	current	authors	are	endeavoring	to	do,	in	fact,	is	just	that:	to	‘kick	off	the	throne’	the	usual	conception	of	spacetime	as	an	all-encompassing	container	for	all	that	 exists.	 	 What	 Zeilinger	 refers	 to	 above	 as	 ‘information’	 we	 suggest	 should	 be	understood	as	ontologically	 real,	 pre-spacetime	possibilities—since	 clearly	 they	are	doing	something	that	constrains	the	actualities	of	our	experience.	We	would	caution	against	 taking	 the	 idea	of	 ‘information’	as	an	observer-dependent,	epistemic	notion,	which	 forecloses	 a	 realist	 understanding	 of	 the	 quantum	 formalism,	 and	compromises	 our	 ability	 to	 subject	 spacetime	 to	 the	 critical	 considerations	 that	Zeilinger	rightly	suggests	it	should	be.	 
VI.		Conclusion	
	 We	 have	 argued	 that	 an	 appropriate	 realist	 understanding	 of	 quantum	mechanics	 calls	 for	 the	 metaphysical	 category	 of	 res	 potentia,	 just	 as	 Heisenberg	suggested	long	ago.	In	particular,	we	suggest	a	non-substance	dualism	of	res	potentia	and	 res	 extensa	 as	mutually	 implicative	modes	 of	 existence,	where	 quantum	 states	instantiate	a	particular,	quantifiable	 form	of	res	potentia,	 ‘Quantum	Potentiae’	 (QP).		As	non-actuals,	QP	 are	not	 spacetime	objects,	 and	 they	do	not	 obey	 the	Law	of	 the	Excluded	Middle	 (LEM)	 or	 the	 Principle	 of	 Non-Contradiction	 (PNC).	 On	 the	 other	hand,	res	extensa	 is	exemplified	by	the	outcomes	of	measurements,	which	constitute	structured	elements	of	spacetime;	the	latter,	as	actuals,	obey	LEM	and	PNC.	We	argue	that	measurement	is	a	real	physical	process	that	transforms	quantum	potentiae	into	elements	of	res	extensa,	in	a	non-unitary	and	classically	acausal	process,	and	we	offer	specific	 models	 of	 such	 a	 measurement	 process.	 In	 this	 ontology,	 spacetime	 (the	structured	 set	 of	 actuals)	 emerges	 from	 a	 quantum	 substratum,	 as	 actuals	‘crystallizing’	out	of	a	more	fluid	domain	of	possibles;15	thus,	spacetime	is	not	all	that	exists.				The	 above	 picture	 accounts	 naturally	 for	 the	 counter-intuitive	 features	 of	quantum	mechanics	 such	 as	 nonlocality,	 entanglement,	 and	 instantaneous	 collapse.		We	affirm	Zeilinger’s	call	for	critical	examination	of	the	usual	notion	of	spacetime	as	a	fundamental	domain	for	all	that	exists,	and	urge	that	this	is	what	needs	to	be	dropped	in	order	to	make	progress	in	understanding	what	our	best	physical	theories	may	be	telling	us	about	Nature.			Acknowledgments.	The	authors	are	grateful	to	Robert	B.	Griffiths,	Christian	de	Ronde,	Mauricio	Suárez,	and	Don	Howard	for	valuable	correspondence.		
	
	
																																																									15	Cf.	Kastner	(2016b)	for	the	connection	of	spacetime	emergence	with	causal	sets.	
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